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unctional democracy. It doesn't
happen automatically. It has prerequisites, including governmental decisions made in public with advance notice by officials who are known and visible. This provides a way for the citizenry
to pass judgment on the performance of
their public officials, both elected and appointed. It also allows citizens to be heard
as decisions are made which affect their
interests.
Perhaps the most important protector
of democracy is a set of statutes called
"sunshine laws." In California, two of
the most important sunshine statutes are
the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act 1
(applying to state agencies) and the Ralph
M. Brown Act 2 (applying to local agencies). Their elements are not complicated. Post your agenda in advance so those
with some interest in what you are doing
will know about it. Meet and make your
decisions in public so what you do may
be seen and reported. Most importantuse the public forum to test what you
intend to do; find out what people think
of it; refine it if need be. And don't try
to evade the law. Accept it. Don't run,
and don't hide.
These are nice sentiments, but there
are problems. These laws are not activated where individual officials are in a
position to make decisions. For example,
the Real Estate Commissioner, the Insurance Commissioner, and other regulatory
officials with substantial public executive, judicial, and legislative powers do
not act in public because they are not
multimember bodies required to "meet"
in order to make decisions. They just
"decide"-alone and in their offices.
Only if a hearing is required by statute
do they convene a public forum-for example, the requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act that rules of an
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agency be adopted after public hearing
(which is triggered only if the agency decides to hold one or someone requests it
in a timely fashion).
But for state agencies guided by
multimember bodies, the law applies to
any meeting of the state body and most
subsets thereof. 3 They cannot decide unless they meet, and any meeting must be
public-which means it must be noticed
in advance and may be attended and
monitored. Fortunately, many important
regulatory agencies are governed, or
their decisions reviewed, by "boards" or
"commissions" or other multimember
bodies. So there is a public crucible for
decisionmaking.
The most troubling evasion of this
seminal democratic protection occurs
where it is avoided en toto based on the
contention that although a multimember
body is involved, a meeting does not
"qualify" for the law's protection-usually because "not enough people are
meeting" or "it's not really a meeting"
or "this is just a committee thing-it will
be brought up again later at a more formal and complete proceeding." The intent of the law is hardly actualized where
the required public proceeding is a later
charade of a prior decision made in private. The real decision is not monitored
when it is made; the opportunity for public participation and consideration of
outside views becomes a fraud. For this
reason, the law has traditionally applied
to all meetings where officials gather together and discuss anything relevant to
their public responsibilities. It is not
merely the final decision which is to be
made in public-the discussion, the consideration, the weighing and deliberation
are to be in public.
The Brown Act covering local agencies is somewhat different than the
Bagley-Keene Act applying to state
agencies. For example, local agencies
are required to reserve a portion of the
meeting for general public comment4;
state agencies are not. Further, the
Brown Act now permits advisory committees of a local board or commission
to meet and discuss public business in
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private, so long as the advisory committee is composed of less than a quorum
of the local board 5-so no business may
be transacted. This flexibility for local
agencies is ill-advised for the reasons
noted above.
The Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act
applying to state agencies does not contain the provision exempting its application where a meeting occurs with "less
than a quorum." Rather, state agencies
(and subsets of state agencies which satisfy the definition of "state body") must
meet in public under Government Code
section 11123, unless their discussion
concerns one of 26 enumerated exemptions in Government Code section 11126.
Unlike the Brown Act applying to local
government, even advisory committees
of state bodies must comply with the
open meeting requirement where, as the
Bagley-Keene Act explicitly provides,
"three or more" officials are meeting. 6
The import of this distinction, requiring state multirnember bodies-including advisory bodies consisting of three
or more persons-to meet in public
under the Act, is momentous. State agencies set the policy of the state as a whole
across entire industry sectors. Their decisions, above all, must not be made in
a private setting. Note that unlike fulltime local governmental bodies, most
state multimember boards consist of unpaid persons meeting as full boards only
once per month or less often. Further,
unlike most local entities, state boards
and commissions are frequently controlled by persons from the very trade or
industry being regulated by that board or
commission. For the protection of the
absent public, these officials-who do
not necessarily live in the local community of the public being affected by their
decisions-especially need public visibility and input. Finally, the application
of the Brown Act's loophole would be
especially pernicious in the state setting:
An eleven-member commission with a
six-person quorum could delegate its
business to four- or five-member advisory committees. The public meetings of
the full commission would merely be a
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summary rubber-stamp of the privately
formulated decisions.
Such a caveat is not a hypothetical
proposition; the use of subsidiary advisory committees by local boards and
commissions, and avoidance of public
decisionmaking through the "less than a
quorum" exception, is common. You see,
gentle reader, our public officials do not
generally embrace the light of public examination. Given the choice, many will
avoid it.
The fact that the Brown Act specifically allows avoidance of notice and public proceedings for a meeting of an advisory committee of a local entity where
there is "less than a quorum" present
does have one palliating aspect: the fact
that the Bagley-Keene Act specifically
does not have that provision. Further, the
Bagley-Keene Act was amended such
that its open meeting requirement explicitly applies to all subsets of "state bodies" except advisory committees consisting of less than three persons.
Or does it? Well, one would think so.
The Bagley-Keene Act was broadly
drafted to apply liberally to state boards,
committees, subcommittees, delegated
bodies, surrogate bodies, inter-agency
bodies, advisory bodies, and the whole
host of governmental structures inevitably created to avoid it.7 In the Brown
Act, however, we have a similar statute
which specifically allows an advisory
committee consisting of less than a quorum of a local entity to more liberally
avoid the law. Application of the most
basic rule of statutory interpretation 8 tells
us that the legislature's failure to replicate
that provision in the Bagley-Keene Act
confirms its intent to require open meetings of all "state bodies" covered by the
statute. If the legislature includes "x" in
one statute and does not include it in a separate but otherwise similar statute, we can
fairly assume that the intent is to .. .include
"x" in one and not in the other. This is
called reading the statute.
But, wait a minute. A certain legal office has opined differently. The Office of
the Attorney General of the State of California has published a "booklet"9 (not a
formal opinion) in which a line deputy
AG has fantasized that the Brown Act's
"less than a quorum" exception reserved
for advisory committees of local "legislative bodies" applies equally to the
"state bodies" covered by the BagleyKeene Act. 10 Where did he get this theory? Good question. Not from the statute. Not from any published case. Not
yet-but they're working on it, as we describe below.
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A History of Legerdemain by the
Attorney General's Office
Let's be absolutely clear on the genesis and chronology of the "less than a
quorum" exception. The Brown Act was
enacted in the Government Code in
I 953; the Bagley-Keene Act was added
in I 967. As enacted, neither contained
any such exception. The AG's Office
originally invented the "less than a quorum" exception to the Brown Act in a
formal Attornet General's Opinion published in 1958. 1 Referring to the Brown
Act as the "secret meeting act" [sic], the
AG noted that the statute applied only to
a "legislative body," then defined as "the
governing board, commission, directors,
or body of a local agency, or any board
or commission thereof." The Attorney
General distinguished the "legislative
body" from committees thereof, and concluded that "only meetings of the legislative body of a local agency are required to be open and public." 12 With
regard to committees of a local legislative body, the AG opined that "meetings
of committees of local agencies where
such committees consist of less than a
quorum of the members of the legislative
body are not covered by the act." 13 The
AG's office reached this conclusion despite its recitation of the well-known legislative intent language contained within
the Brown "secret meeting law." 14
In 1967, the legislature enacted the
Bagley-Keene Act applicable to state
bodies. In spite of the Attorney General's
"longstanding administrative interpretation" of the similar Brown Act, the
legislature did not see fit to include a
"less than a quorum" exception in the
Bagley-Keene Act. Other than the exempt topics of discussion contained in
Government Code section 11126, all
meetings of all entities qualifying as
"state bodies" under the Act were required to be held in public.
In 1968, the legislature codified the
"less than a quorum" exception-originated by the Attorney General's premature interpretation-into the Brown Act
at Government Code section 54952.3.
That section provided then-and still
does today-that the term "[l]egislative
body as defined in this section does not
include a committee composed solely of
members of the governing body of a
local agency which are less than a quorum of such governing body." 15 Note the
italicized limitation: The section pertains
only to "advisory committees" of legislative bodies. By its own terms, the
"less than a quorum" exception is inapplicable to local legislative bodies or

subsets thereof which are other than
advisory in nature. And note: While the
legislature codified the AG's "less than
a quorum" exception into the Brown Act,
it failed to do so for the similar BagleyKeene Act.
However, from the late 1960s until
the present, the Attorney General's Office has continued its assault on the language of the Brown Act, and also performed its prestidigitation on the BagleyKeene Act. Regarding the Brown Act, it
opined in a series of internal, informal
letters that the "less than a quorum" exception applies not only to advisory
committees as confined in section
54952.3, but to other "legislative bodies"
defined in section 54952. 16 These informal opinions cite the Office's self-created exception and note its "longstanding
existence" since 1958, ignoring the relevant and substantive amendments to the
Brown Act since that time, 17 including
section 54952.3 noted above which confined "less than a quorum" secret meetings to advisory committees of local
agencies under the Brown Act.
In 1978, one court-Henderson v.
Board of Education of the Couniy of Los
Ange/es 18-considered a Brown Act
challenge to private meetings held by a
three-member advisory committee of a
local seven-member board of education.
Instead of simply citing section 54952.3
(which had existed for ten years) and
sending the plaintiff packing, the court
launched into a spate of dicta including
lengthy quotations from the AG's internal letters which-even post-section
54952.3-continue to insist that the
Brown Act "does not apply to meetings
of committees of less than a quorum of
the legislative body of the local
agency"-without any limitation to advisory committees as required by the
statute. With much help from the AG's
Office, this unfortunate dicta has taken
on a life of its own. Relying on that
dicta, the AG constantly cites Henderson
as affirming its opinion that even nonadvisory, "less than a quorum" committees may meet in private. 19 In turn, local
governments continue to violate the
Brown Act, citing the AG's imprecise interpretation of the Henderson dicta. 20
Then, having excessively shaded the
sunshine law applicable to local agencies
beyond "advisory committees," the Attorney General began to engraft its "less
than a quorum" Brown Act exception
onto the Bagley-Keene Act applying to
state agencies. As early as 1977, it informally opined that the exception a:fiplies
equally to su_bsets of state bodies. 1
In 1981, the legislature decided to
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add a provision to the Bagley-Keene Act
regarding advisory committees of state
bodies. Did it adopt the 1977 AG's informal opinion, evincing its agreement
with it? No. Did it simply replicate the
"less than a quorum" exception from the
Brown Act's section 54952.3 applying to
advisory committees of local legislative
bodies? No. It enacted Government Code
section 11121.8, which provides that
even advisory committees of state bodies, "if created by formal action of the
state body or of any member of the state
body, and if the advisory body so created
consists of three or more persons," must
meet in public. Thus, the legislature rejected the "less than a quorum" exception for state bodies in favor of a brightline test by explicit declaration.
It is hard to imagine a clearer indication of the legislature's intent here. But
the AG still doesn't get it-or pretends
not to get it-because it continues to
apply inapplicable Brown Act concepts
rejected by the legislature in the BagleyKeene Act context, and specifically to
opine that the "less than a quorum" exception applies to nonadvisory committees of state bodies. 22
Unfortunately, this erroneous interpretation has found its way into caselaw.
In Funeral Security Plans, Inc. v. State
Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 3 the plaintiff-a funeral director licensee of the Board-challenges
numerous procedural improprieties it alleges the Board has committed, including closed sessions of a Board advisory
committee which plaintiff claims are unlawful under the Bagley-Keene Act. The
committee at issue is comprised of two
Board members; two staff members (the
Board executive officer and an auditor)
regularly attend meetings to assist the
committee. If we were defending the
Board, we'd simply argue that the committee is exempt from the public meeting
provision of the Bagley-Keene Act because it's an advisory committee and it
does not contain "three or more persons"
under Government Code section 11121.8.
The AG's Office-which defends state
agencies in litigation-made this argument, but went further. Unforgivably
misleading the court by citing Brown Act
cases, Brown Act AG opinions, and
Brown Act concepts on an issue which
is unambiguously addressed in the clear
language of the Bagley-Keene Act, the
Office argued that "[a]s long as a quorum of the board is not involved, no
'meeting' occurred" which was required
to be conducted in public. 24
In an unnecessarily deferential opinion reminiscent of (and relying on) Hen-

derson, the trial court actually bought
this latter, untenable, and dangerous argument. The Sacramento County Superior Court held that although the language of the Bagley-Keene Act might
appear to compel the committee to hold
public meetings, 25 "an overriding principle applies" which permits the advisory
committee to meet in closed session. Citing Henderson (an inapplicable Brown
Act case), the court held that the "less
than a quorum" exception "has been applied administratively for many years to
state agencies operating under the
Bagley-Keene Act as well. See Open
Meeting Laws (1989), California Attorney General's Office .... Since the Act has
been amended several times without disturbing this long-standing administrative
interpretation, this exception is entitled
to respect and, unless clearly erroneous,
should be followed. " 26 This holding, of
course, is correct under Government
Code section 11121 .8; the tortured reasoning the court used to get there, led
by our AG's Office, is erroneous. This
regrettable decision reflects the overriding deference paid to executive agencies
and their counsel by many California
courts. The case is now pending before
the Third District Court of Appeal.
In addition to Funeral Security Plans,
a second case involving the Attorney
General's interpretation of the "less than
a quorum" exception is pending; the California Supreme Court recently granted
review in Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
Orange County Employees Retirement
System Board of Directors. 27 Here, the
respondent local government is advancing the Attorney General's anti-democratic and-perhaps more troubling-intellectually dishonest arguments. In
Freedom Newspapers, the Court has before it an appellate court decision which
carefully traces the relevant history of
the Brown Act. Based upon that legislative history and the actual, operative language of the Brown Act, the court ruled
that meetings of four-member committees of a nine-member local body must
be held in public, because the committees meet the current definition of "legislative body" contained in Government
Code section 54952. The court of appeal
rejected the flawed analysis of Henderson and its citation of informal Attorney
General "indexed letters," commenting
that reliance on unpublished letters of the
AG's Office is "somewhat like relying
on a treatise that itself relies on a nonpublished opinion of the Court of Appeal
and does not explain the rationale of the
non published opinion .... We decline in
this opinion to join this circle of error.
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While we agree that courts should give
great weight to the published opinions of
the Attorney General, they are not bound
to perpetuate obvious errors in nonpublished indexed letters." 28
The AG's continuing and insistent interpretation of these two statutes implies
that (I) state and local boards and commissions may create committees which
have binding decisionmaking authority,
and (2) these committees may meet in
private so long as they comprise less
than a quorum of the board or commission which created them. This interpretation is absolutely contrary to the intent,
spirit, and language of both statutes.
Hopefully, both the court of appeal reviewing the superior court's servile decision in Funeral Security Plans and the
Supreme Court reviewing the correct
analysis of the court of appeal in Freedom Newspapers will focus on the unambiguous words and intent of the
legislature, and conclude that there is no
such thing as a "nonadvisory committee" which is permitted to meet in private, either under Brown Act section
S49S2 or Bagley-Keene Act sections
11121-11121.7. Only "advisory committees" may meet in private, and then
only if they comprise less than a quorum of a local legislative body under
the Brown Act or less than three members of a state body under the BagleyKeene Act. All other conceivable subsets
of state and local agencies are required
to meet in public, unless their. topic of
conversation satisfies one of the subjectmatter exemptions.
We do not urge this position on the
basis of the underlying policy-conceding that it represents our preference-but
from the application of the most basic
rules of legislative interpretation. Here,
it consists of simply reading the statute,
and honestly attempting to apply its facial and unambiguous meaning. It is difficult to read the briefs in these two
cases-in both, the respondents rely on
the opinions of an office funded by The
People and obliged above all others to
maintain exemplary standards, including
some measure of intellectual integrity. It
does not lessen our distress that the arguments are offered in order to advance
a position antithetical to legislative intent
and democratic values.

The Genesis of the Problem:
The Acculturation of
Deputy Attorneys General
The conflict problem confronting the
Attorney General is a conundrum. The
Office is a special kind of attorney. First,
the Office is the attorney of these state
3
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agencies. It represents them. [Query,
how much weight should be given to the
opinion of an attorney framed to the advantage of his client?] But at the same
time, the Attorney General is the chief
law enforcement officer of the state. This
dualism creates many problems for the
Office (problems which appear to warrant its constitutional division and restructuring). But it is reasonable to expect the chief law enforcement obligations of the Office to supersede the representation of agencies. In fact, where
legal counsel is performing in full ethical
regalia, one does not have to be vested
with special law enforcement status to
tell a client: "That is wrong. You will
not do that or you can get yourself another attorney."
Occasionally the Office of the Attorney General will do that-usually if it is
a political matter. But when agencies are
just wrong on the law and refuse to follow sound advice, even where the results
are cruel and abusive, our public attorneys all too often defend the bad rather
than repair to higher ground.
The reason has to do with the acculturation of attorney to client which imbues many of the regulatory agencies;
these deputy attorneys general literally
join the tribe. Adding to that problem is
the "hired gun" ethic many attorneys
mistakenly deduce from the moral relativism implicit in Socratic law school
training (there is no right or wrong; just
different arguments, all of which are
flawed). The final result: I am a "professional," which means I am to maximize
advantage for my client. I advise my client in order to advance his or her interests and attempt to steer him away from
the reefs and shoals his proposed actions
might impose. I am "his" or "hers."
Wrong, my brethren. Ideally, you are
accountable too. And in a more democratic world, just as your public clients
would shoulder the accountability they
so assiduously avoid, so would you.
How does one explain the Office of
the Attorney General standing for the
proposition that the most important statute in the Code defending democratic
values and assuring public government
is loopholed based on an interpretation
fabricated out of thin air? Is there accountability within the Office? Competence? Why doesn't the Office purge
these obviously outmoded decisions now
that they have been rejected by the
legislature?
If there is to be a response to the eternal Archimedean search for honesty
among our institutions, it must begin
with the Office of the Attorney General.
4

Here is the proper repository of our highest standards: the chief law enforcement
officer of our state. But thus far, this Office has attempted to block the light of
California's most important sunshine laws.
It has done so with "disingenuous analysis"-this is lawyerspeak for "lying."
The development of the downward
spiral on this important issue is not directed from the top. It really has not mattered who has been the Attorney General. These briefs and positions are not
reviewed from an aspirational or even a
generalist perspective. The inmates rule
this part of the asylum. The civil service
line deputies are "defending their agencies," who want maximum secrecy and
unfettered discretion. Creative arguments
easily slide into error, usually through
the process of half-truths. "I won't lie;
I'll just state half of it. Then it's up to
the other side to correct the record."
As wrong as this assumption may be,
it is particularly reprehensible for a public official, and for this officer of the
court. Contrary to some perceptions, the
public prosecutor has a special duty to
the truth; for example, he or she does
not seek to convict, but to determine the
truth, and to help produce even-handed
justice. The credibility of public agencies
to the public, and to the courts reviewing
the prosecutor's contentions, properly
depends upon their fealty to higher duties, not to procuring an advantage for a
client agency. In this case, the Attorney
General's course of action in seeking
such advantage comes at a heavy price;
it seeks to create by judicial holding unenacted loopholes to allow common
avoidance of our most important sunshine statute, the procedural underpinning for open government, the condition
precedent to our precious democracy.
~

ENDNOTES
I. Government Code section 11120
et seq.
2. Government Code section 54950
et seq.
3. See Government Code sections
11121-lll21.8 for the Bagley-Keene
Act's broad definition of a "state body"
subject to the Act's public meeting requirement in Government Code section
11123; see especially section 11121.8,
which even includes an advisory body as
a "state body" if it is "created by formal
action of the state body or of any member of the state body, and if the advisory
body so created consists of three or more
persons."
4. Government Code section 54954.3(a).

I
5. Government Code section 54952.3.
The "less than a quorum" exception in
section 54952.3 of the Brown Act is expressly confined to advisory committees
of "legislative bodies"; other entities
qualifying as "legislative bodies" under
the Brown Act may not avail themselves
of the exception and must meet in public
unless the topic of discussion falls within
one of the exempt areas listed in Government Code sections 54956.7 (consideration of license applications filed by
persons with criminal records), 54956.8
(real estate negotiations}, 54956.9 (pending litigation), 54956.95 (discussion of
claims for payment of liability losses),
54957 (personnel matters), 54957 .6
(labor negotiations}, and 54957.8 (discussions of case records by the legislative body of a multijurisdictional drug
law enforcement agency).
6. Government Code section 11121.8.
7. See Government Code section
11120 et seq.; see especially sections
11121-11121.8.
8. Estate of Simpson, 43 Cal. 2d 594
( 1954 ); In re Khalid, 6 Cal. App. 4th 733
(1992); Hennigan v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d I (1975);
Signal Oil and Gas Co. v. Bradbury, 183
Cal. App. 2d 40 ( 1960).
9. California Attorney General's Office, Open Meetings Laws (1989).
10. Id. at 14 ("{e]ven though this office has informally concluded that the
less than a quorum exception generally
applies to meetings of state bodies, the
exception is specifically inapplicable to
advisory committees [under Government
Code section 11121.8]") (emphasis
added). Note that in reciting this interpretation in an informal booklet, the AG
has relied on a previous informal opinion.
11. 32 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 240
(1958).
12. Id. at 242.
I 3. Id. Note that section 54952 of the
Brown Act has since been amended to
define the term "legislative body" to
mean "the governing board, commission,
directors or body of a local agency, or
any board or commission thereof, and
shall include any board, commission,
committee, or other body on which officers of a local agency serve in their official capacity as members and which is
supported in whole or in part by funds
provided by such agency, whether such
board, commission, committee or other
body is organized and operated by such
local agency or by a private corporation"
(emphasis added).
Section 54952.2 was added in 1981
to further include within the definition
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of the term "legislative body" "any
board, commission, committee, or similar multimember body which exercises
any authority of a legislative body of a
local agency delegated to it by that legislative body" (emphasis added).
14. "In enacting this chapter, the
Legislature finds and declares that the
public commissions, boards and councils
and the other public agencies in this
State exist to aid in the conduct of the
people's business. It is the intent of the
law that their actions be taken openly
and that their deliberations be conducted
openly.
The people of this state do not yield
their sovereignty to the agencies which
serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants
the right to decide what is good for the
people to know and what is not good for
them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain
control over the instruments they have
created." Government Code section 54950.
15. Government Code section 54952.3
(emphasis added).
16. This view, first published in Indexed Letter (I.L.) 69-131 (June 30,
1969), was later included in the 1972
edition of the AG's publication entitled
Secret Meeting Laws Applicable to Public Agencies. It finally found its way into
formal opinions in 1980, 63 Op. Cal.
Att'y Gen. 820, 823 (1980), and in 1981,
64 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 856 (1981).
17. See supra note 13. For a full
treatment of the history of the "less than
a quorum" exception to the Brown Act,
see Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange
County Employees Retirement System
Board of Directors, 9 Cal. App. 4th 134
(1992), pet'n for review granted, Nov.
30, 1992, No. S029178 (hereinafter referred to as "Freedom Newspapers").
I 8. 78 Cal. App. 3d 875 (1978).
19. 68 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 34 n.11
( 1985); 63 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 820
(1980).
20. See, e.g., Freedom Newspapers,
supra note 17.
21. I.L. 77-104 (July 8, 1977).
22. See California Attorney General's
Office, Open Meetings Laws ( 1989) at
13-14 and 20-21, in which the AG's office continues to insist that the "less than
a quorum" exception applies to nonadvisory committees of state bodies covered by the Bagley-Keene Act. See also
68 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 34, 40 n.11 (1985).
23. Funeral Security Plans, Inc. v.
State Board of Funeral Directors and
Embalmers of the Department of Consumer Affairs, No. 512564 (Sacramento
County Superior Court, April 24, 1991 );

this case is now on appeal to the Third
District Court of Appeal (No. 3-CIV0011460).
24. Id. (Defendants' Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 19).
25. The court here was referring to
Government Code section 11121.7, which
provides that the term "state body" also
includes "any board, commission, committee, or similar multimember body on
which a member of a body which is a
state body pursuant to Section 11121,
11 I 21.2, or 11 I 21.5 serves in his or her
official capacity as a representative of
such state body and which is supported,
in whole or in part, by funds provided
by the state body, whether such body is
organized and operated by the state body
or by a private corporation." Under a literal reading of this section, even a twomember committee of the Funeral Board
(a state body) must meet in public so
long as the members are serving in their
official capacities as Board representatives and the committee is supported in
whole or in part by the Board. 65 Op.
Cal. Att'y Gen. 638 (1982). With regard
to two-member advisory committees,
however, courts may consider section
11121.8 (with its specific reference to
advisory committees) as controlling over
the general, broad language of section
11121.7.
26. Funeral Security Plans, Inc. v.
State Board of Funeral Directors and
Embalmers of the Department of Consumer Affairs, No. 512564 (Sacramento
County Superior Court, April 24, 1991 ),
supra note 23.
27. Freedom Newspapers, supra note

17.
28. Id. at 147.
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